It is a common practice in transform-do main fragile watermarking schemes for authentication purposes to watermark some selected transform coefficients so as to minimise embedding distortion. However, we point out in this work that leaving most of the coefficients unmarked results in a wide-open security gap for attacks to be mounted on them. A fragile watermarking scheme is proposed to implicitly watermark all the coefficients by registering the zero-valued coefficients with a key-generated binary sequence to create the watermark and involving the unwatermarkable coefficients during the embedding process of the embeddable ones. Non-deterministic dependence is established by involving some of the unwatermarkable coefficients selected according to the watermark from a 9-neighbourhood system in order to thwart different attacks such as cover-up, vector quantisation, and transplantation. No hashing and cryptography are needed in establishing the non-deterministic dependence.
and the prevalence of interconnected networks, researchers have been actively investigating methods of information hiding for authenticating and verifying the content integrity of the multimedia in the last decade. Various types of fragile watermarking schemes [1, 2, 5, [8] [9] [10] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] have been proposed to serve these purposes. The watermarks of the robust watermarking schemes [7, 12] for copyright protection are expected to survive different types of manipulations to some extent provided that the manipulated media are still valuable in terms of commercial importance or significant in terms of visual quality. Unlike robust schemes, the schemes for the purposes of authentication and content integrity verification are supposed to be fragile, i.e., we expect the watermark to be destroyed when attacks are mounted on its host media so that alarms can be raised when wrong watermark is extracted. Therefore, the emphasis of the fragile watermarking schemes is focused on the sensitivity to attacks [11, 19] or even incidental manipulations in some cases [1, 8, 9, 20] .
To be considered effective, a fragile watermarking scheme must meet the common requirements such as localising tampering, detecting geometric transformations (e.g., cropping and scaling), signalling removal of original objects, addition of foreign objects, and alerting other image processing operations (e.g., low-pass filtering). In addition, it is more pragmatic to authenticate the media without referring to the original unwatermarked version. This feature is commonly referred to as blind detection [3] .
Moreover, it is equally important that a fragile watermarking scheme must show no security gaps to attacks such as cover-up / cut-and-paste [1] and vector quantization [17] (also known as birthday attack [1] , the Holliman-Memon counterfeiting attack [6] , or collage attack [4, 13] ). Cover-up attack is the action of cutting one region / block of the image and pasting it somewhere in the same or another image. Vector quantization / birthday attacks are devised on the basis of the so-called birthday paradox [14, Appendix 8 .A]: What is the minimum population size such that the probability that at least two of the people have the same birthday is greater than 0.5? According to birthday paradox, using a hash function that produces a bit string of length l, the probability of finding at least two blocks that hash to the same output is greater than 0.5 whenever roughly 2 l/2 watermarked blocks are available. The idea of the attack is to forge a new watermarked image (a collage) from a number of authenticated images watermarked with the same key and the same logo / watermark by combining portions of different authenticated images while preserving their relative positions in the image. Fridrich et al. [4] showed that counterfeiting is possible even when the logo is unknown to the attacker provided that a larger number of images watermarked with the same key are available.
Block-wise dependence is accepted as an essential requirement to combat vector quantization / birthday attacks [4-6, 8-10, 17] . However, it has also been shown that dependence with deterministic context, i.e., the information involved or dependent upon is deterministic, is susceptible to transplantation attacks or even simple cover-up attacks [1] .
The 'transplantation attack' derived by Barreto et al. [1] 
RELATED WORKDS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
In Wong's public-key scheme [16] , the LSB-zeroed target image and the binary watermark image are divided into blocks of the same size. The image size together with each LSB-zeroed image block is then provided as inputs to a hash function and the output together with the watermark block are subjected to an exclusive-or (XOR) operation. The result of the XOR operation is then encrypted using a private key and embedded in the least significant bits of the original image. This scheme marries cryptography and watermarking elegantly and indeed works well in detecting cropping, and scaling. However, due to the lack of mutual dependence among neighbouring blocks during the watermarking process, this scheme is vulnerable to cover-up, vector quantisation, and transplantation attacks.
Wu and Liu proposed a scheme [18] that inserts a binary watermark sequence into the DCT coefficients via a look-up table, which maps all possible values of DCT coefficients randomly to either 1 or 0. In the embedding process, to embed 1 in a DCT coefficient, the coefficient is kept unchanged if the corresponding entry of that coefficient is also 1 in the look-up table. If the corresponding entry is 0, the coefficient is changed to the closest value whose entry is 1 in the look-up table. A similar process is applied to the case for embedding 0s. At the receiver side, the extraction of the watermark is simply done by looking up the table. Although, this scheme does not require the original image for watermark extraction, the same look-up table used in the embedding stage is necessary in the watermark extraction stage, which has to be transmitted through a secure channel and may compromise the security of the scheme. Moreover, like Wong's scheme [16] , this scheme is also block-wise independent, and, therefore, vulnerable to cover-up, vector quantisation, and transplantation attacks.
Recognizing the importance of establishing dependence among neighboring pixels or blocks, we proposed a scheme [8] that uses a binary feature map extracted from the underlying image as watermark. The watermark is then divided into blocks of size 32 × 16 pixels. Block-wise dependence is established by blending the neighbouring blocks before encrypting and embedding into LSBs of the image. This method is effectively resistant to vector quantization and cover-up attacks and requires no a priori knowledge about the image to be watermarked. However, the accuracy of localization is limited by the block size. Moreover, like schemes of [16] and [18] , this scheme is also vulnerable to transplantation attack because the contextual dependence is established based on deterministic information. To circumvent these drawbacks, we further proposed a scheme [9, 10] , which is immune to transplantation attack and is significantly accurate in locating tampering. However, it is a spatial-domain approach, which is not suitable for transform-domain applications.
To thwart transplantation attack, Barreto et al. [1] , who pointed out how the attack is possible, proposed to generate the fingerprint of each image block through the calculation of a hash function taking the target block, a neighbouring block, and some random data as inputs. Since the random data is unique to each block, the fingerprint is thus unique and non-deterministic. However, the hash operation is relatively time-consuming and the accuracy of the tampering localization is limited by the size of the block. Moreover, as a spatial domain approach, this scheme is not suitable for transform-domain applications either.
Although there are some transform-domain schemes reported in the literature, a common security gaps inherent in many of them [15, 18, 19] is that they neither explicitly nor implicitly watermark all the transform coefficients. As a result, manipulation of those unwatermarked coefficients will go unnoticed. For example, in the wavelet transform-domain approach proposed by Winne at el. [15] , to minimize the embedding distortion and maintain high localization accuracy, only the coefficients of the high frequency sub-bands at the finest scale of the luminance component are watermarked. All the other coefficients and components are neither watermarked nor involved during the watermarking process of the embeddable coefficients. In [19] , to make the scheme semi-fragile, only the LL component of the coarsest scale are involved in generating the signature, which is then used as the watermark. To minimize embedding distortion, only the coefficients of the finest scale are watermarked. Consequently, tampering the coefficients in other sub-bands and scales will certainly go undetected. For example, locally tampering the three unwatermarked high frequency sub-bands at the coarsest scale, which are not involved in generating the signature, is highly likely to change or at least destroy the semantic meaning of the watermarked image without raising alarm.
In Fridrich et al's work [5] , all the coefficients are protected by taking all quantised DCT coefficients as input to the hash function and using the hash output as the signature, which is then embedded in the least significant bits of the lossless compressed version of some selected coefficients. However, the hash output conveys only global information about the image. When a local attack is launched against the coefficients that are not selected for embedding the hash, their algorithm can only tell that the image is not authentic without being able to locate the position where the tampering occurs.
In the light of the limitations of the reviewed schemes, it is desirable to design a transform-domain scheme, which is immune to the afore-mentioned attacks and provides protection for all the transform coefficients without explicitly watermarking all of them.
Given the popularity of the JPEG standard, which adopts Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), a scheme watermarking the DCT coefficients is proposed in the next section for authenticating JPEG images.
PROPOSED WATERMARKING SCHEME
To embed the watermark, the target image is first DCT transformed and quantised. A A: a binary sequence with the length of the same size as the image (i.e., 64× p) generated with a secret key. It is organized in the same manner as X, e.g., A i (j) stands for the jth bit of block A i of A.
B: a binary sequence with the same length as that of A, which is also organized in the same manner as X. Any bit B i (j) is assigned a value of 1 if its corresponding DCT coefficient X i (j) is not zero, otherwise, 0 is assigned instead.
W: the binary watermark sequence resulted from the EXCLUSIVE-OR operation, denoted as ⊕, on A and B. Therefore,
Like B, W is also organized in the same manner as X such that the jth bit of watermark block i is denoted as W i (j). Since B records the position of zero-valued DCT coefficients with '0', replacing a zero coefficient X i (j) with a non-zero value switches its corresponding bit B i (j) from 0 to 1, which in turn, messes up W according to Eq (1) .
N 9i (j): the dependence neighbourhood / context of the watermarkable coefficient X i (j) comprising the 9 gray DCT blocks including X i itself as shown in Figure 2 .
S i (j): the secret sum associated with watermarkable coefficient X i (j). It is the sum of the non-zero unwatermarkable coefficients within N 9i selected according to their corresponding watermark bits and W i (j). It can be expressed as
where h′ is the lowest frequency among the four watermarkable coefficients. Figure   3 shows how the coefficients in X i are selected for calculating S i (j). Suppose X i (16) in Figure 3 (b) is to be watermarked. Since W i (16) is 0 as shown in black background in Figure 3(a) , according the Eq (2), only the unwatermarkable non-zero coefficients (as highlighted in gray background in Figure 3(b) ) with corresponding zero-valued watermark bits (as highlighted in gray background in Figure 3(a) ) contributes to the calculation of S i (16) . This idea applies to all the other 8 neighbouring blocks.
T i (j): the concatenation of S i (j) and X i (j) in two's complement format
Watermark embedding algorithm
Now, the proposed watermark embedding algorithm can be described as follows.
Step e 1. Perform DCT on the input image and quantise the DCT coefficients.
Step e 2. Generate A with a secret key
Step e 3. Generate B
Step e 4. Generate the binary watermark W according to Eq. (1) Step e 5. For each DCT block X i , repeat Step e 5.1 and Step e 5.2
Step e 5.1. Identify the four watermarkable coefficients
Step e 5.2. For each watermarkable coefficients X i (j), repeat Step e 5.2.1 and 5.2.2
Step e 5.2.1. Calculate S i (j) associated with X i (j) according to Eq. (2) Step e 5.2.2. Modulate the selected coefficient X i (j) so that
where Parity is a function which returns 1 or 0 as output to indicate that the number of '1' bits is odd or even
Authentication algorithm
For the verifier, the authentication algorithm works as follows:
Step a 1. Decode the received JPEG image to get the quantised DCT coefficients
Step a 2. Generate A with a secret key
Step a 3. Generate B
Step a 4. Generate the binary watermark W according to Eq. (1) Step a 5. For each DCT block X i , repeat Step a 5.1 and Step a 5.2
Step a 5. Step a 5.2.1. Calculate S i (j) associated with X i (j) according to Eq. (2) Step a 5.2.2. Authenticate the selected coefficients by verifying whether Eq. (3) holds or not. If the coefficient fails the authentication, i.e., Eq. (3) does not hold, the block, which the coefficient belongs to, is shaded to reduce the transparency so as to indicate the occurrence of tampering.
Step a 6. Turn off the false alarms. Any blocks marked as inauthentic surrounded by less than k inauthentic blocks are treated as authentic. (Argued in Sec. 3.3).
Security analyses of the proposed algorithms
We can see, from the definition of B, that B is intended for differentiating zero-and non-zero coefficients. It is possible to take the secret-key-generated binary sequence A as the watermark W without directly using B and performing Eq. (1) is to register and implicitly watermark the zero-valued coefficients, which will not be explicitly watermarked.
Furthermore, by involving the secret sum S i (j) defined in Eq. (2) when watermarking coefficient X i (j), the non-zero unwatermarkable coefficients are also involved and is thus implicitly watermarked without distortion. These two features allow all the zero and non-zero unwatermarkable coefficients to be protected without being explicitly watermarked.
Barreto et al. [1] observed that, by using a nondeterministic signature, even the signatures of two identical images will be different. In our algorithm, the secret sum, S i , Since the second-order neighbours are involved in the calculation of the secret sum S i , any DCT block when manipulated will have direct impact on the correctness of the secret sum of its 8 second-order neighbours. That is to say that when a DCT block is manipulated, in addition to the true alarm raised by the block itself, it is highly likely that all its 8 neighbours will also raise false alarms depending on the values of the corresponding watermark bits of the manipulated coefficients. The false alarms reduce the accuracy of the tampering localization.
Step a 6 of our authentication algorithm is meant for tackling this problem. Any blocks marked as inauthentic surrounded by less than k (0 ≤ k ≤ 7)
inauthentic blocks are treated as authentic. The smaller the value of k is, the less forgiving the algorithm becomes, but the more inaccurate the algorithm is in locating tampering. Figure 5 and Experiment 1demonstrate an example with k = 6.
EXPERIMENTS
In the following experiments, a decoded test image of size 248× 248 pixels along with its watermarked version stamped with the proposed scheme are shown in Fig. 4 (a) and 4(b), respectively. From Fig. 4(b) we can see that the distortion after adding the watermark is invisible. To test the effectiveness of our scheme, experiments are conducted by mounting local tampering, cropping, and low-pass filtering attacks on the watermarked image as
follows. The value of h, the highest frequency among the four watermarkable coefficients is set to 12. The value of 6 is assigned to k in Step a 6 of our authentication algorithm.
Experiment 1. Local tampering:
The doorknob between the twin's head in the received image is removed, which involves only one DCT block, as shown in Fig. 5(a) . The authentication result before Step a 6 is shown in Fig. 3(b) , with the 9 blocks failing the authentication highlighted with shading effect. After
Step a 6, the false alarms are turned off, with the only true alarm left on as shown in Fig. 5(c) . The shaded block between the twins' head indicates that the received image has been locally tampered with.
Experiment 2. Cropping:
The received images as shown in Fig. 6(a) is the cropped version of the watermarked image in Fig. 4(a) . After authentication, the dominating shaded blocks in Fig. 6(b) indicate that the received image has been tampered with.
Experiment 3. Low-pass filtering:
In order to test if the watermark can survive this attack, the received image is low-pass filtered as shown in Fig. 7(a) . The dominating shaded blocks in Fig. 7(b) indicate that the proposed algorithm is capable of detecting this type of global image processing operations.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we pointed out that a secure fragile watermarking scheme must implicitly watermark all the coefficients and proposed a scheme based on this idea. The main contributions of the proposed scheme can be summarized as follows.
By involving the unwatermarked non-zero coefficients in the watermarking process of one sixteenth of the DCT coefficients and registering the zero coefficients with the watermark, the proposed scheme minimises the distortion due to watermark embedding while providing the capability of authenticating all the coefficients including the zero ones.
The simple idea of watermarking the DCT coefficients according to a secret sum extracted from a dependence neighbourhood puts up resistance to cropping, cover-up, vector quantization and transplantation attacks.
The scheme is able to localize tampering such as removal of original objects and addition of foreign objects to the accuracy of individual DCT block visually and of individual DCT coefficient mathematically.
High security and low computational complexity are achieved without using cryptography and hash function.
Neither the original image nor other a priori knowledge is required in the watermark extraction process.
We are currently investigating the possibility of modifying this scheme so that it can be applied to the images compressed with JPEG 2000 standard, which involves wavelet transform. 
